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Introduction 
The field of epistemology is concerned with the nature, generation and justification of 
knowledge as well as the rationality of belief; addressing what makes beliefs justified, 
what it means to say that one knows something and how one knows it (Matthias 2017; 
Wenning 2009). It has been characterized by many debates such as those between 
rationalism and empiricism or those between absolute truth and relativism. In light of the 
often pibolar framing of such epistemic debates, the scholarship on ubuntu contains 
insights that help advance the idea of a ‘deliberative’ epistemology, which is well 
positioned to resolve many such tensions. With this idea, which speaks to like-minded 
approaches that are couched within frameworks such as conversational philosophy 
(Chimakonam 2017) and complementary reflection (Asouza 2004), I add the dimension 
of discourse (i.e. how we think, speak and therefore do) and show that by applying an 
alternative discursive lens an ubuntu-inspired epistemology need not only account for 
experience and subjectivity, as typically presumed, but can also embrace a priori 
knowledge and objective truth. 
 
In order to explore this more fully I call to mind the Cartesian paradigm, “because it 
builds the epistemological foundation for research as we know it” (Seehawer 2018) or at 
least as we often use it. In contradistinction to the more constructivist epistemological 
approaches associated with this broadly Western way (see Botha 2011), knowledge 
generation and justification in other paradigms from around the world has been thought 
of differently, for example in terms of traditional and revealed knowledge (Brant 
Castellano 2000). And although they do not necessarily or always contradict conventional 
(Western) research methods, drawing often on years of systematic observations (see Dei 
& Asgharzadeh 2006), they constitute contrasting epistemological considerations as they 
may be informed, for example, by a realism of horizontal interconnectedness within and 
between the physical and non-physical realm. In these paradigms knowledge gained 
through revelations, dreams and intuitions can count as much as other forms of 
knowledge (Lavallee 2009, Louis 2008). They differentiate themselves from an 
“atomistic conception of society [and] the overrepresented role of the individual” (Gobo 
2011: 423), emphasizing instead community, cohesion and relatedness. 
 
Ubuntu or the notion of relationality associated with it has been discussed as one such 
entry point. It specifically offers a lens through which knowledge has been defined as the 
essence of experience after communal discourse about its meaning (Mucina 2011). In 
other words knowledge is generated and justified through communal discourse (Seehawer 
2018)(see also Battle, 2009; Ramose, 1999; 2002a; Tutu, 1999; Vanier, 1998; Werbner & 
Ranger, 1996; Wiredu, 2002) and through the cultivation of relations with others (see 
Marx, 2002; Swanson, 2012). Importantly, seemingly contradictory truths can emerge 
because everyone adds their own voice and subjectivity (Mucina 2011: 9). However, as I 
will discuss, this does not necessarily have to mean, as many propose (see Battle, 2009; 
Mangena, 2017; Nabudere, 2011; Ramose, 1999), that ubuntu takes a primarily or 
exclusively experiential position in the generation/justification of knowledge or that 
ubuntu is rightly associated with a rejection of objectivity and a favoring of subjectivity 
and relativism (see Christians, 2004; Fourie, 2011; Duncan & Seleone, 1998). Instead, 
while I agree that empiricism and relativism are relevant, I show that a priori knowledge 
can be just as important as experience in an ubuntu-based epistemology and that the idea 
of an objective truth need not be cast away either. I do this by challenging the way we 
think and speak of prevalent epistemic debates and by introducing and teasing out the 
idea of a ‘deliberative epistemology’ derived from the cohesive, harmonious and 
relational notions of power implicit in ubuntu and from the related concept of 
‘deliberation culture’ (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018a). In this way I am not authoring ‘an’ 
ubuntu epistemology, but rather articulating a deliberative epistemology informed by or 
related to ubuntu. I propose that through this integrative yet emancipatory lens horizontal 
and vertical ways of knowing can be reconciled.  
 
Acknowledging my limitations as a communication scholar, I do not focus on all the 
tensions or sub-debates within and between the various paradigms or on an exhaustive 
account of past and contemporary debates on this theme. To resolve or discuss these each 
would far exceed the scope of this project. Rather, with the exception of a few references, I 
remain on the macro-theoretical side, discussing how general epistemological orientations 
can be viewed, spoken of and treated differently through an alternative assessment and 
specifically how both a priori and objective truth can be accounted for in an ubuntu-related 
epistemology. My overall goal with this article, then, is to contribute to and expand on the 
scholarship that considers ubuntu in relation to epistemology and which transcends its 
African origins. By doing this I advance inquiry and insight into the idea of a 
‘deliberative epistemology’ through which a richer pool of insight can be accessed and 
largely false dichotomies transcended.  
 
My article is structured as follows: After a note on positionality, I delve into a brief 
discussion on the background of African epistemology and where I see this paper located 
in related to it. I then offer a discussion on how dominant (Western) philosophical 
frameworks create, by discursive default, opposing categories through which even non-
Western concepts (e.g. ubuntu or an ubuntu-related epistemology) are often assessed 
along binaries. I then discuss an alternative philosophical framework, provided by 
conversational philosophy (Chimakonam 2015; 2017), which, coupled with a related 
approach to discourse, namely ‘deliberation culture’ (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018a), 
constitutes an alternative lens through which an ubuntu-related epistemology can be re-
conceptualized. In the final section I discuss this ‘deliberative epistemology’ in broad 
strokes.  
 
A note on positionality 
I acknowledge that my own voice as someone who can be seen as ‘non-African’ by 
others poses potential traps for the process of meaning making as regards ubuntu and 
African philosophy. Yet I find that the importance of ‘conversing’ (see Chimakonam 
2015; 2017) from multiple angles, and certainly from a place of love for African thought, 
outweighs its potential pitfalls as I strive to discuss ubuntu in ways that others have 
understood it and then elaborate on it as I understand it in terms of providing a deeply 
relational and ‘deliberative epistemology’ with a universal dimension that can very much 
account for the possibility of an ‘object truth’ as well as knowledge that is independent of 
all particular experiences. As such I concede that I may be imbuing it with my own 
meanings, which are nevertheless motivated by the desire and effort to understand, to 
transcend colonialism and to contribute to ‘the conversation’ (ibid) for a more 
sustainable, representative and diversely constituted approach to scientific inquiry. As 
someone who grew up too dark to be Austrian, too Baha’i to be Iranian and too 
White/other to be African, I wonder through a space where I am, on the one hand, a 
perpetual outsider and on the other, privy to a singularly multi-cultural perspective, which 
strives for complementarity and cross-cultural consultation. 
 
Negotiating between a particularist and universalist African epistemology 
As ubuntu can be termed African, it is fruitful to unpack the broader (epistemological) 
context in which I explore it. The term African epistemology is often understood as the 
way in which “the African conceptualizes, interprets and apprehends reality within the 
context of African cultural or collective experience” (Udefi 2014: 108)(see also Anyanwu 
1983: 60). The idea here is that philosophical concepts can be interpreted using African 
categories and concepts “as provided by the African cultural experience without a 
recourse to Western or alien conceptual frameworks” (Udefi 2014: 108). In its earlier 
days, this project was driven for the most part by theologians who proposed that an 
African way of knowing follows from African ontology and that Africans have known 
God well before being colonized (see Abraham 1966; Danquah 1968; Idowu 1962; Mbiti 
1969; Tempels 1959). In this context, Tempels’ analysis of Bantu philosophy is a seminal 
work, which is echoed in some cases as a source of pride and identity against the cultural 
devaluation perpetrated by colonialism (see Senghor 1964), and is contested or critically 
engaged with in others. For example Kagame (1966) exerted effort to align Tempels’ 
propositions with the realities of African experience. In this context, claims that ascribed 
an analytical reasoning to European thought and an intuitive reasoning to African thought 
(see Senghor 1965) have been strongly contested:  
 
Apart from denying Africans any capacity for engagement in rational discourse 
and a reduction of the African mode of knowledge to sensuality and emotions, it 
also unwittingly justifies, in a poetic manner, Levy-Bruhl’s ascription of child-
like and ‘pre-logical mental frame to the Africans (Udefi 2014: 110) 
 
However, such reactions derive from the assumption that analytical reasoning is 
inherently more important or valuable than intuitive reasoning and this may, in itself, be a 
result of coloniality and inherited ways of thinking.   
 
The later phase in African epistemology is marked by the appearance of scholars and 
philosophers rather than religionists, some of whom guarded against the ethnocentrism of 
earlier philosophers and proposed using Western concepts to interpret African experience 
(see Horton 1967; Roy 1986; Wiredu 1985) as well as others who exerted effort to study 
African epistemology by adopting distinctly African categories (see Hallen & Sodipo 
1997; Bedu-Addo 1985) and to promote the growth/emancipation of non-Western 
thought. In this context, the tension between those who purport that there is a uniquely 
African way of knowing and those who argue that the human experience is universal but 
marked by cultural nuances can be said to stem from their respective conceptions of 
philosophy (Udefi 2014: 110). The former (see Irele 1981) ground their arguments on a 
contextual idea of philosophy, “as expressions of the world-views and thought patterns of 
specific cultures” (Hook 1999: 12) and propose that every people or culture has its own 
nature or spirit. Ruch and Anyanwu (1981)(see also Anyanwu 1983), for example, 
distinguish African epistemology against Western approaches by highlighting the sense 
of interdependence of subject and object, self and external world, which they relate to 
sense perception, imagination, intuition and reason. The latter see philosophy as 
transcending the limits of culture and time, even though they stemmed from specific 
cultural contexts and foundations (Gyekye 2004: 23), and reject the idea of a distinctly 
African epistemology.  
 
Against this backdrop I agree with Udefi (2014: 113) that there “is need for some 
flexibility since there are both elements of particularity and universality in 
epistemological conceptualization”. We can conceptualize knowledge and rationality that 
arises out of the experience of various peoples and cultures while acknowledging our 
common humanity. This can lead to the fruitful exchange of insights and knowledges 
between many peoples and cultures. Hence, I seek a truly representative ‘conversation’ in 
the way Chimakonam (2015; 2017) conceptualizes it between various approaches, those 
of African origin and those from around the world. This conversation engages with yet is 
not culturally highjacked by the dominant Western discourse. It is within the context of 
this cross-cultural conversation (see ibid), that I consider ubuntu and an ubuntu informed 
approach to epistemology as being able to transcend the dominant approach. 
 
Epistemic tensions, contradictions and misalignments through the dominant lens 
The dominant approach to epistemology has been characterized by many discursive 
tensions such as those that propose reason as the source of knowledge and those that 
privilege experience or the senses. Tensions are also expressed between notions of truth 
and relativism and often arise as the point of justification of such. “These two broad 
approaches can be evidenced in the opposed categories of objectivism and subjectivism, 
foundationalism and antifoundationalism, absolutism and relativism, realism and 
antirealism, essentialism and antiessentialism, modernism and postmodernism, and so 
forth” (Smith & Karlberg, 2009: 60). In each pair, the former term is known as a vertical 
approach and expresses a variation on the theme that human knowledge, when pursued 
through the correct methods, can have a direct connection with, or correspondence to, 
reality or truth. The latter term, on the other hand, is known as a horizontal epistemology 
and posits that all human knowledge is socially constructed within diverse interpretive 
frameworks, meaning that it has no direct connection with, or correspondence to, 
foundational reality or truth (ibid).  
 
These dualities and tensions are typical of discourses in the Western sciences and speak 
of the ‘normative adversarial’ paradigm (see Karlberg 2004) that informs how we 
view/assess and frame them discursively, including how African philosophy is thought 
and spoken of (for example by denigrating intuitive reasoning and juxtaposing it, as 
discussed above, in polarity with a favored sense of analytical reasoning). These 
strategies can be traced to the ancient dualisms of the Greeks. Here the assumption is that 
a contest of ideas and the harnessing of competitive energies is the best way to generate 
knowledge. With this approach, “ancient Greece formalized adversativeness as no other 
culture had done” (Ong 1974) and propagated a culture of learning that is, to date, 
characterized by the propensity to think in polar opposites, to challenge and to compete 
(Karlberg 2004:56). Although many scholars will view themselves as ‘moderate’ or 
closer to the middle of such debates, the underlying premise or assumption implicit in 
terms such as ‘moderate’ is that there are ideal polarities in the first place. Thus, an 
objectivist, who holds that few principles are universal, and that their application varies 
by culture and society or a conventionalist who carefully defines a society and then 
argues exactly how their moral principles came about are both telling of the fact that, 
while middle ground and overlaps can be found, we ideally come to things from one 
doctrine or another (see Yount 2013). The question, we are led to ask under this broadly 
Cartesian logic, is “Which theory explains the phenomena better?” (ibid:n.p.), implying 
that one or the other does. 
 
This same logic is then applied (consciously or unconsciously) to the way we assess 
ubuntu, which is frequently summed up through the proverb “a person is made a person 
by other persons” (Tutu, 1999). Ubuntu is said to emphasize the idea of ‘becoming’ in the 
context of daily interactions and specifically a journey towards becoming more ‘human’ 
(Vanier, 1998). It highlights the interdependence of persons for the exercise, development 
and fulfillment of their potential to be both individuals and in community with others 
(Battle, 2009:2). Ubuntu describes the way we are essentially linked together and 
prescribes self-realization in terms of communal, harmonious and cohesive relationships 
with others (Metz, 2011: Metz & Geaie, 2010; Mnayaka & Motlhabi, 2005). Where 
Western thought “insists on freedom [...] of the sacred self from intrusion by others”, in 
ubuntu “a person’s freedom depends for its exercise and fulfilment on personal 
relationships with others” (Christians 2004:243). Ubuntu also stresses “to belong and to 
participate” (Mkhize, 2008:39-40), to be “inextricably bound to others” (Mnyaka & 
Motlhabi, 2009:69) and to exhibit an overarching sense of ‘we’ that nestles other, 
textured and diverse identities towards which ‘we’ show ‘solidarity’ (Metz, 2015:77). Its 
deep relationalism forms a symbiotic relationship between ‘individualism’ and ‘holism’ 
through unity-in-multiplicity (Christians, 2004:244) which justifies, in this way, the non-
partisan approach found in African democratic thought where political candidates do not 
answer to a constituency but rather to the community as a whole. Ubuntu also 
foregrounds deeply relational and immaterial aspects of power and backgrounds the more 
material and conflictual ones, shifting our gaze from one over-emphasized aspect of a 
complex phenomenon to one that is under-emphasized in Western literature. As Louw 
(2001:1) suggests, “Ubuntu is power sharing [...] ‘a person is a person through sharing 
his/her power’”.  
 
According to Ramose (2002b:230-232), “ubuntu is the root of African philosophy” upon 
which “the fundamental ethical, social, and legal judgment of human worth and human 
conduct is based”. For him, ubu- is the ontological and –ntu the epistemological aspect of 
this concept (ibid:50). Building on this, Battle (2009:135) suggests that, “African 
epistemology begins with community and moves to individuality”. This implies the 
ontological need of the individual to know self and community. Thus, “Ubuntu is a 
wellspring that flows within African notions of existence and epistemology in which the 
two constitute a wholeness and oneness” (Ramose, 1999). Such a relational realism 
significantly contrasts the colonial heritage of adversarial thought and offers an 
alternative to the Hobbesian idea that human nature is exclusively selfish, suggesting 
instead that it can also be conceived of as profoundly other-oriented. It implies that 
human beings, while diverse, distinct and unique, have interests that can be thought of as 
bound-up or complementary rather than inherently divergent and oppositional. The ways 
of knowing associated with this philosophy, then, are operationalized as “circular, 
organic, and collectivist, rather than linear, unitized, materialistic, and individualistic” 
(Swanson, 2012:37). They seek “interpretation, expression, understanding, and moral and 
social harmony, rather than being preoccupied with verification, rationalism, prediction, 
and control” (ibid, see also Asante, 1987; Bell, 2002; Ramose, 1999). 
 
Ubuntu is also said to have a universal dimension. It “is a piece of home-grown African 
wisdom that the world would do well to make its own” (Setiloane in Vicencio, 
2009:115). Even if we focus only on the idea of relationality it espouses, it becomes clear 
that such an ethic of interconnectedness qualifies to make a contribution towards an 
epistemology that is both emancipatory in the way that it distinguishes itself from 
Western liberal thought, yet in my view integrative in that it does not reject such thought. 
In other words it draws on its African heritage while being in constant dialogue with 
other knowledge systems, building on them and cross-pollinating with them (see also 
Chimakonam 2017). Although some may disagree with me and invoke it as an ethic that 
represents resistance if not secession, ubuntu does not have to stand in a dichotomous 
relationship with Western thought. It is distinctive yet not opposed to but rather bound-up 
with other ways of thinking and seeing. In this way its knowledge base enriches other 
knowledge bases while also learning from them. This open-endedness allows for a 
“fusion of horizons” and a “pooling of knowledge drawn from all cultures and which is 
accessible to all” (Nabudere, 2011:162). Ubuntu epistemology recognizes and works 
‘with’ rather than ‘against’ other ways of knowing and creates a space for “self-
disclosure and cross-cultural validation” (ibid). This conception of ubuntu also guards 
against nostalgic essentialism that some scholars caution can be a pitfall (Tomaselli, 
2003) because in this way ubuntu remains in the making, contemporary and self-
disclosed. It brings together various ways of knowing rather than ‘dividing’, ‘competing 
with’ or ‘opposing’, and in so doing, transcends coloniality and its inherited strategies. 
While some suggest that ubuntu is too vague (Mokgoro, 1998:2), that it exists alongside 
other non-relational proverbs and philosophies (Suttner, 2017) and that it has been abused 
to motivate violence (Mbigi & Maree, 1995) or is prone to be abused politically (see 
Tomaselli, 2003; Rodny-Gumede, 2015:123), it is in its non-essentialist, contemporary 
and ideal understanding that I view ubuntu as relevant to epistemology. 
 
Ubuntu knowledge has been defined as “the codified essence of experience after 
communal discourse about its meaning, within a specific worldview while using specific 
symbolism” (Mucina 2011: 1). The idea of ‘I know because we know’ springs to mind. In 
contrast to a Cartesian epistemology, in an ubuntu paradigm knowledge is thought to not 
be "generated and validated by individuals or through conventional scientific processes, 
but through communal discourse” (Seehawer 2018). Because of its relational dimensions 
then, rooted firmly in community, and because of the way we categorize and assess 
thought as being of one school or another, scholars typically take as their point of 
departure that an ubuntu-related epistemology is experiential or a function of the 
experiences of a community (Battle, 2009; Ramose, 1999; 2002a; Seehawer 2018; Tutu, 
1999; Vanier, 1998; Werbner & Ranger, 1996; Wiredu, 2002). This is derived from the 
idea that knowledge, as is the case in Shona society, is often expressed through listening 
to elders telling stories of their experiences as youth and how such experiences can be 
relevant to the lives of today’s youth. Such practices are underscored by proverbs like 
“experience is the best teacher” and “we passed through the millet field and we know that 
there are no sweet reeds there” (Mangena, 2017:n.p.). Nabudere (2011) proposes that 
African philosophy must be located in the lived historical experiences of people and not 
in abstractions that have very little meaning in actual life. In this context Nabudere 
(ibid:135) refers to Chinweizu’s idea of ubuntology, which the latter considers an 
autonomist African framework by Africans for Africans, an answer as it were to the 
Euro-centric idea of ‘African Studies’, and an instrument for the Black world to study its 
global-historical experiences on its own terms. While Nabudere extends this 
epistemological approach and suggests it can benefit humanity more generally, what 
becomes clear is that in either case a primarily experiential focus prevails. 
 
Similarly relativism plays a significant role (Battle, 2009; Mangena, 2017; Nabudere, 
2011; Ramose, 1999). Different knowledges or truths are thought to emerge from the 
same discourse, because each person adds to it their ‘own contextual position’” 
(Seehawer 2018: 6). Dei and Asgharzadeh (2006) posit further that indigenous 
epistemological approaches do not claim universality but rather relevance for specific 
contexts and are therefore relativist. For example, in delineating an ubuntu-based 
journalistic approach, Christians calls for a move away from the realm of libertarian 
objectivity where journalists are brokers. Instead he calls for a move towards what he 
calls ‘authentic disclosure’ (Christians, 2004). In considering unrealistic and 
unproductive the role of objectivity for journalists, he proposes that media practitioners 
and citizens should disclose their views and embed them historically and biographically. 
This implies self-reflexivity so that participants of a discourse conceive of their beliefs 
with some measure of distance or as beliefs they hold rather than beliefs that hold them 
(see Louw, 2001:21). Instead journalists become mediators that take into account 
multiple interpretations and cultural complexities (Duncan & Seleoane, 1998) and 
become active members and participants of the community and its discourses rather than 
being observers (Fourie, 2011:38). Nabudere (2011:162) echoes this with the concept of 
self-disclosure, where the cultivation and contextualization of diverse views becomes 
paramount as a way of knowing. Likewise Wasserman (2013) speaks of the cultivation of 
‘listening’ as a means of straining to hear another’s narrative and point of view. This is 
especially important in contexts where the truth of one person or that of one social group 
is universalized as the master narrative.  
 
However, the imbalanced representation of voices in our world and the appropriation of 
truth by social elites need not motivate a rejection of the idea that ubuntu can also be 
associated with the principle of truth. The tendency for subjectivism and 
contextualization to be favored and elicited in ubuntu does not inherently preclude the 
possibility of an overarching truth towards which one could strive collectively. Similarly, 
rational ways of knowing need not be discounted entirely in an epistemology that values 
experience but is none the less integrative. In the section that follows, I elaborate on this 
view and suggest that, while experience and relativism play vital roles in an ubuntu 
epistemology, they need not be the only ways of acquiring or justifying knowledge. 
Reason can be reconciled with experience and objectivism with subjectivism if one 
assesses from within a framework of conversational philosophy (Chimakonam 2015; 
2017) and takes the principles of deliberation culture (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2017; 2018a) 
as one’s point of departure.  
 
An alternative lens 
When we cease to assess knowledge through conventional ‘Western’ methods (see 
Wearing 2015: 75) and change our realism and discursive lens, we can discover that both 
experience and reason, subjectivity and objectivity can be accounted for in ubuntu. Such 
an alternative lens and method can be located within African philosophy where, emerging 
from a time where it was confined to Africa in focus and agency, it is now being 
recognized as transcending its borders in nature and role (see Chimakonam 2015; 2017). 
The work that is generated in this regard (see for example Asouzu 2004; Iroegbu 1995; 
Wiredu 1995) is beginning to mutually reinforce itself as it creates something new and 
transcends dominant discourses and discursive patterns. Among the champions of 
explicitly encouraging horizontal cross-pollination, Chimakonam (2017) speaks 
specifically of striving to cultivate an intercultural philosophy that builds something, 
evolves and speaks with other approaches. Providing a compelling related framework on 
which global (also epistemological) discourses can be grounded in more equal footing, he 
specifically elaborates on the idea of conversational philosophy. Conversational 
philosophy as a theory (Chimakonam 2015; 2017) is understood as the idea of philosophy 
within (‘micro’) and across (‘macro’) borders in an effort to engage and globalize 
thought. Related to this, conversationalism as a method of thought is a mechanism for 
studying reality without imposing one culture’s epistemic categories on another 
(Chimakonam 2017: 115). It is an intercultural method, which accounts for balance and 
justice in the process of intercultural cross-pollination and is rooted, as I see it, in the 
same spirit of relationalism and interdependence that I associate with the African 
philosophy/ethic of ubuntu. It comes close to but is more formal and universal than 
Asouza’s method of complementary reflection (2004).  
 
And such conceptual frameworks provide the most relevant point of entry for me to 
(re)assess an ubuntu-inspired epistemology on which we do not re-imprint Western 
modes of thinking, I also offer a novel discursive dimension with the idea of deliberation 
culture (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018a), which addresses specifically our discourses and the 
framing of our discourses. Deliberation culture is derived from the principles of ubuntu 
and addresses the deeper assumptions embedded in how we communicate and transcends 
the deeply naturalized and unconscious adversarial codes embedded in how we think, 
speak and act in relation to (epistemological/philosophical) subjects. In other words, 
while my project is very much one of providing ‘inclusivity’ and ‘complementarity’ 
within ‘the conversation’ as Chimakonam (2017: 124) would seek to do, I come at this 
from a place of transcending the adversarial codes we frequently use even within African 
philosophy and which are contained in such ideas as “proponents and opponents”, 
“contestations and protestations” (Chimakonam 2015: 20) or ‘thesis’ and ‘anti-thesis’ and 
so forth. I offer instead the idea of conversationists as ‘allies’, who, while diversely 
textured in their views, offer up these views from within one and the same 
side/camp/panel. While such a distinction may seem like semantic hairsplitting, it is 
exactly the semantics I’m addressing. I propose that it is the crux of what can distinguish 
African philosophy from Western approaches that are deeply embedded in attitudes of 
‘pro and con’, ‘left and right’, ‘right and wrong’ and where the implicit assumption is that 
human beings are essentially selfish; that they organize around their mutually exclusive 
interests; and that the best way to manage this competitive energy in a world of ‘scarce 
resources’ is through adversarial contests (see Karlberg 2004). Such is the deeply 
internalized Western liberal approach I question and uncover in the above terms and 
which have shaped for decades and centuries not only philosophy around the world but 
many aspects of science. These are explicitly addressed through the framework of 
deliberation culture, where participants of a (philosophical) discourse engage in critical 
yet mutualistic conversation and draw from their common human identity as they express 
the insights of their nestled sub-identities and strive to gain collective insight. In this way 
deliberation culture elicits freedom of expression but balances it against other relevant 
rules of engagement, such as “courtesy, dignity, care and moderation” or “tact, wisdom, 
timeliness” without “glossing over conflicts or demanding that people bury their 
differences and speak to each other in artificially polite tones” (see Karlberg 2010: 35) 
but rather by cultivating attitudes of expression that allow “conflicting perceptions an 
interests to be critically examined […] in an atmosphere within which problems become 
soluble challenges” (ibid: 36). And for this project certain principles apply that differ 
slightly from (namely in discursive manifestation) or rather complement the canons of 
conversational philosophy yet derive, as I see it, from a deeply related spirit. These 
principles and how they can re-shape the idea of an ubuntu-related epistemology are 
discussed in the section that follows.  
 
Reconciling and transcending tensions 
Derived from harmonious, cohesive and relational understandings of power and human 
relations deliberation culture (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018a; 2018b) is a communal and 
collaborative form of inquiry that I have articulated in the context of media and 
communication and as a contribution to public discourse. In brief, deliberation culture 
encourages the contextualization and flexibility of views and stimulates diversity and 
participation. It is both dialogical and deliberative in its objectives and exhibits and 
cultivates an open-ended (rather than binary or exclusive) approach to framing; an 
invitational and exploratory (rather than chiefly persuasive) form of rhetoric; an all-
encompassing ‘we’ (rather than oppositional) identity formation that embraces a diversity 
of nested and textured sub-identities; and finally, a facilitatory type of mediation. What 
distinguishes it from many other models of public discourse, are its deeper assumptions 
around human nature and social relations. In particular it moves away from inherently 
conflictual and primarily material ways of perceiving the world to deeply energy-based 
and relational ones. By discussing a few of the formal elements of this approach (i.e. 
framing, rhetoric, identity) in relation to the epistemic framing mentioned at the outset of 
this piece, I intend to show how these elements come together to constitute an alternative 
lens through which such binaries can be reconciled and that realities and meanings can be 
renegotiated in ways that rise above colonial interpretations and traditions.  
 
These traditions are marked by deeply internalized and agonistic ways of perceiving the 
world and frame theories as ‘competing’ or as ‘in favor of’ or ‘against’. This is 
exemplified in debates that pertain to whether rationalism or empiricism can or do form 
the basis of one’s way of knowing. In other words the assumption is that either one or the 
other must equate to the right way and energies are then poured into presenting 
compelling arguments that persuade the other camp of its rightness and validity. This 
naturalized approach is premised on the view that ideas are mutually exclusive and 
divergent. As a result overlaps, contexts, nuances and complementarities are often 
obscured. From within an assessment provided by the framework of a conversational 
approach, however, and through the lens of a ‘deliberative epistemology’ more 
specifically (i.e. deriving from ‘deliberation culture’), which takes as its point of 
departure that ideas need not be oppositional but are rather bound-up and that they 
explicate various facets of complex realities, the dichotomy of rationalism and 
empiricism can be reconsidered as providing complementary ways of knowing that 
enhance each other. Similarly, taking the open-ended approach to framing that 
deliberation culture entails, the ‘either/or’ binary can be opened up to allow for ‘both’ a 
priori and a posteriori ways of knowing to count simultaneously. And instead of taking a 
chiefly persuasive posture, such debates can be formed around an invitational and 
exploratory stance towards reality, where the exact relationship between these ways of 
knowing is considered. As such, scholars need not be categorized along partisan lines that 
can never correspond fully to some imagined and clearly delineated reality and which 
limit the complexity each scholar brings to the fore. As also advanced through 
conversational philosophy (Chimakonam 2015), theorists can be thought of as 
collaborating in the project of shedding light on the various ways and sources of knowing 
and this must be expressed, as suggested by deliberation culture, in explicitly mutualistic 
discursive terms. Instead of fueling divides, disproving other’s contributions or 
categorically rejecting schools of thought, those who embark on discovering realities can 
see themselves as contributing towards, building on and expanding the various insights 
that are garnered from the multiplicity of backgrounds that exist.    
 
From within such a deliberative, ubuntu-related epistemology, then, it is possible to know 
through innate knowledge as well as through experience. It is possible to have innate 
knowledge against which one makes sense of experiences and to know and understand 
reality through one’s experiences without discarding the possibility that one may uncover 
in the process an innate compass. Neither of these foci needs to preclude the other. They 
are simply alternative ways of knowing the world, in the same way that science and 
religion may uncover alternative facets of reality; namely its material and spiritual 
dimensions. Such dimensions may in fact be as inseparable as the chemical and 
biological components of a leaf, which we chose, for heuristic purposes, to dissect in 
order to make sense of that leaf. In other words, debates around whether reason or 
experience form the true basis of knowledge, when assessed through 
conversational/deliberative approaches, are as one-sided as debates that question whether 
sodium, potassium and calcium make up the reality of a leaf or whether stomas, 
mesophylls and epidermises do. Similarly the idea that relative/absolute truth and 
subjective/objective truth are essentially opposed and mutually exclusive ways of 
knowing can be seen as limiting and, at closer look, not essential. I’m not the first person 
to suggest this. In building on Kluge (2007) and Bernstein (1983), Lample (2009) 
articulates a non-foundational epistemology that can exist with a foundational ontology 
by recognizing on the one hand, that human knowledge of reality is constructed and, on 
the other hand, that human comprehension can, over time, through dynamics of 
consultative communication, action and reflection, lead to increased attunement with 
foundational truth and the nature of reality. Smith and Karlberg (2009) expand and justify 
this through the idea that some truth claims are more socially constructed, and thus less 
attuned to a foundational reality and that other truth claims are less socially constructed 
and therefore more attuned. Their project also involves the notion that relativism is in and 
of itself a truth claim about the non-existence of foundational truth and that it draws 
therefore on absolutism. In a similar vein, I propose that a deliberative epistemology 
rooted in ubuntu would open up the framing of these conceptual dualisms and allow for 
the possibility or the consideration of an overarching truth, even if only conceptually, 
towards which citizens, media people, policy makers and experts can strive and which 
materializes the more people participate in its quest collectively. Likewise, instead of 
entrenching a posture of offense and defense, an invitational and exploratory stance 
towards the interplay of objectivity and subjectivity can produce fruitful insights that 
enhance rather than limit how human beings can perceive the world and what actions 
they may take vis-a-vis their perceptions.  
 
To provide a practical example and in coming back to the questions of which theory 
explains a phenomenon better (see Yount, 2013), the answer from the position of a 
deliberative epistemology, then, would be that both theories could provide a more 
complete picture: Yount refers specifically to the poverty of stimulus problem; namely to 
the example of three year olds who may use language in ways that are not explicitly 
taught and queries which theory, empiricism or rationalism, may best explain that 
children form original sentences from words they hadn’t put together in those specific 
ways before or that they understand grammatical rules before they are taught what a noun 
or verb is. A deliberative epistemology would not assume these ways of knowing to be 
mutually exclusive, but rather to be capable of providing a more complete picture in 
harmony with one another. From within this epistemic lens, children can be seen as 
learning/knowing both through experience as well as through innate potentials, the exact 
interplay of which can be explored through collective inquiry. Neither aspect has to be 
discounted by default. They are after all a product of discursive categorization. 
 
Such an approach also helps us reconsider what some would say is the primarily relativist 
focus of ubuntu and explains, to bring another example, Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s 
advocacy of the spiritual power of ubuntu in recovering ‘truth’ and one’s innate 
knowledge of it. This notion of truth is rich and multifaceted and includes both personal 
or narrative truth as well as more forensic notions - be they foundational, social or 
restorative (see Marx, 2002; Swanson, 2012). The exact understanding of the idea of 
foundational truth will vary, of course, and can be thought of in terms of a spectrum 
where ‘divine’ truth associated with seeing in others, as Tutu suggests, the God in whose 
image all people are made, as one end of the spectrum and the relational truth of 
‘collective’ human endeavor on the other. While Tutu speaks both as an African and as a 
Christian, the spiritual heritage and diversity of cultures within which ubuntu emerges 
and which draw, as Bhengu (1996:38) says, from elements of both the ‘visible and 
invisible worlds’, provide enough grounds for considering such a range of 
understandings. In fact, incorporating, celebrating and building on “multiple, 
overlapping, non-exclusive and partial identities” derived from “gender, age, family, 
ethnicity, nationality, religious beliefs, occupation, personal interest, socio-economic 
status and so forth”, none of which inherently “preclude a sense of ‘oneness’ with others” 
(Salazar, 2002:102), is vital for an ubuntu conception of identity. Yet even if we prefer to 
view ubuntu in purely ethical and non-transcendental terms, ‘higher truth’ can be 
understood in terms of that which pertains to the culmination of collective social 
endeavor (i.e. ‘social’ truth). In this way, truth may be seen as a more abstract concept 
that can never be fully achieved but which can be striven for and approximated to the 
extent that collective and communal effort is exercised and to the extent that as many 
voices as possible are included. In other words it is achieved by becoming and by striving 
towards unity/cohesion. This is in line with the ubuntu conception of power, which 
expands the more it includes rather than excludes and which results in mutual 
empowerment (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018b; 2018c).  
 
Conclusion 
In order to reconsider the dimensions of knowing that are opened up to us through an 
ubuntu-inspired approach, I introduced the idea of a deliberative epistemology, which is 
located within a framework of conversational philosophy and draws on discursive 
elements provided by deliberation culture. Deliberative epistemology is based in the 
principles of ubuntu and transcends some of the tensions and binaries that ensue when we 
assess through the dominant lens. Rooted in harmonious, cohesive and relational notions 
of power it renders meaningless some forms of epistemological tension. While it may 
distinguish itself from the dominant colonial perspective, this approach need not reject it 
entirely. Instead, it can build on, work with and integrate those perspectives in inclusive 
ways. Such an epistemic orientation is rooted in ‘humble togetherness’ (Swanson, 
2012:39) and frames discourses around ways of knowing in mutually inclusive, 
complementary and open-ended ways. Its primary rhetorical orientation is exploratory 
and deliberative, inviting and array of even seemingly paradoxical standpoints. In 
exploring the various facets of reality, it operates from within an overarching and 
collaborative ‘we’ that allows for a wealth of textured and self-reflexive sub-
interests/positions but deconstructs the I/other dichotomy in powerful ways. Namely by 
‘re-sourcing’ collectively. In other words, it conceptualizes and organizes inquiry as a 
collaborative process. Various debates and theories are seen as complicit in the project of 
attaining knowledge. It allows for material and immaterial ways of knowing, brings 
together empirical and rationalist viewpoints, objectivist and subjectivist views and 
synthesizes the insights gained from these various perspectives into a ‘more complete’ 
picture that can be further refined and brought into focus the more voices participate in its 
quest. By embracing this epistemology a deeper understanding can be reached into the 
nature of things that transcends the limiting polarities informed by neocolonial and 
neoliberal ideology. 
 
When we become aware that we have naturalized such deeply competitive and 
individualist ways of perceiving the world and that these enter our philosophical and 
emancipatory efforts, we are also able to reframe and ‘come to know’ many realities in a 
new way. In this context Swanson (2012) relates that, despite a growing openness to 
dialogism and a considerable shift in consciousness, which is reflected in Sen’s (1999) 
conception of development as that which advances freedom, development discourses in 
the global North still largely revolve around reproducing “the same hierarchy of power of 
nations” (Swanson, 2012: 31). Such deficit discourses frame development in terms of 
material instruments such as gross national product, income and advances in technology 
and industry, which create a competitive edge and still “need to be taught” and 
implemented in places like Africa because such democratic instruments are seen as 
“foreign to their culture and worldview” (ibid). Born out of a Western epistemology with 
Kantian and Utilitarian roots that favor individualism (see Metz, 2014: 147) and 
promulgate individually driven prosperity, this framing reproduces the false assumption 
that democracy is not relevant to African contexts. As such the agenda for development is 
understood as an effort to ‘survive’, ‘recover’ and ‘catch up’, which can never be quite 
achieved because of the “competitive advantage of powerful nations” (Swanson, 2012: 
32). However, such conceptions of democracy are problematic. They derive from the 
common sense realism that power is inherently conflictual and material and that 
democracy is synonymous with the concept of partisanship even though there is no 
necessary correlation between the two (Karlberg, 2004:43). This form of competitive 
democracy is a culturally specific model that has been naturalized in Western societies 
and is closely linked with the evolution of capitalist economies (ibid). Both are gleaned 
from the assumption that people are essentially selfish and competitive and that it is 
normal and necessary to structure politics and social life as a contest. From within this 
perspective, the African idea of non-partisan democracy, which values communality, 
caring and respect for fellow human beings and which favors consensus as an outcome 
worth striving for (see Wiredu, 2002), is seen as repressive or prone to collectivism. 
Viewed from an alternative epistemic lens, however, such notions of democracy can be 
seen as cultivating diversity and harmony as well as being conducive to freedom and 
prosperity.  
 
The extent to which this deliberative epistemology can be further explored, refined and 
built on depends on the willingness of those who are interested to step outside of their 
naturalized realism and to consider the insights that can be gained from beyond it. It 
requires buying into a new sense of global citizenship, one that is not appropriated by any 
one group or peoples. It requires us to reclaim diversity and search for ways in which we 
can find ourselves in others and others in ourselves, while offering what is uniquely 
provided to us by virtue of our circumstance and history.  
 
References 
Anyanwu, K. C. (1983). The African experience in the American market place a scaring 
indictment of western scholars and their distortion of African culture. New York: 
Exposition Press  
 
Asante, M.I. (1987). The Afrocentric Idea, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 
 
Asouzu, I. (2004). The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection In and Be- 
yond African Philosophy, Calabar: University of Calabar Press 
 
Battle, M. (2009). Ubuntu: I in You and You in Me. New York: Seasbury Publishing 
 
Bedu-Addo, J. T. (1985). On the Concept of Truth in Akan, In Bodunrin, P.O. 
(ed.)(1985) Philosophy in Africa, trends and perfectives, Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press.  
 
Bell, R.H. (2002). Understanding African Philosophy: A Cross-Cultural Approach to 
Classical and Contemporary Issues, New York: Routledge 
 
Bhengu, M.J. (1996). Ubuntu: The Essence of Democracy. Cape Town: Novalis 
 
Bernstein, R. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and 
Praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 
 
Botha, L. (2011). Mixing Methods As a Process Towards Indigenous Methodologies. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 14(1): 313–325  
 
Brant Castellano, M. (2000). Updating Aboriginal traditions of knowledge. In G. J. S. 
Dei, G.J.S., Hall, B.L. & Rosenberg, D.G. (Eds.), Indigenous Knowledges in Global 
Contexts: Multiple Readings of our World, Toronto: OISE/UT & University of Toronto 
Press 
 
Chimakonam, J.O. (2017). What Is Conversational Philosophy? A Prescription of a New 
Theory and Method of Philosophizing, in and Beyond African Philosophy, Phronimon 
18(1): 115-130 
 
Chimakonam, J.O. (2015). Conversational Philosophy as a New School of Thought in 
African Philosophy, Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies, 3(1): 9-40 
 
Christians, C.G. (2004). Ubuntu and Communitarianism in Media Ethics. Ecquid Novi, 
25(2):235-256. 
 
Cline, A. (2017). What is Epistemology? ThoughtCo, 22 July 2017, Available: 
thoughtco.com/what-is-epistemology-250526, accessed 9 October 2017 
 
Dei, G. J. S., & Asgharzadeh, A. (2006). Indigenous Knowledge and Globalization: An 
African Perspective, In Abdi, A.A.P., Korbla,P. & Dei, G.J.S. (Eds.), African Education 
and Globalization: Critical perspectives, Oxford: Lexington Books 
 
Duncan, J. & Seloane, M. (1998). Introduction, in Duncan, J. & Seloane, M. (eds)(1998). 
Media and Democracy in South Africa, Pretoria: HSRC, 1-53 
 
Eze, M.O. (2008). What is African Communitarianism?: Against Consensus as a 
Regulative Ideal, South African Journal of Philosophy. 27 (4):106-119 
 
Fourie, P. (2011). Normative Media Theory in a Changed Media Landscape and 
Globalized Society, In Hyde-Clarke, N. (ed)(2011). Communication and Media Ethics in 
South Africa: 25-45, Cape Town: Juta 
 
Gobo, G. (2011). Glocalizing methodology? The Encounter Between Local 
Methodologies, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 14(1): 417–437 
 
Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Reflections on the African Experience. 
New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Gyekye, K. (2004). The Unexamined Life Philosophy and the African Experience. Lagon: 
Sankofa Publishing Company Ltd  
 
Hallen, B. and Sodipo, O. (1997). Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic 
Experiments in African Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
 
Hook, J. M. V. (1999). Universalism and particularism: African Philosophy or 
Philosophy of Africa, African Philosophy, 12(1)  
 
Horsthemke, K. (2004). Indigenous Knowledge: Conceptions and Misconceptions, 
Journal of Education, 32(1): 31-48 
 
Horton, R. (1993). African Traditional Thought and Western Science. Africa, 37(1-2). 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell  
 
Ikuenobe, P. (2006). Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in 
African Traditions, Lanham: Lexington 
 
Irele, A. (1981). The African Experience in Literature and Ideology. London: Heinemann 
 
Iroegbu, P. (1995). Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy, Owerri: International 
Universities Press 
 
Kagame, A. (1966). Bantu-Rwandan Philosophy of Being. New York: Johnson Reprints 
Corporation 
 
Karlberg, M. (2010). The Press as a Consultative Forum: A Contribution to Normative 
Press Theory, Baha’i Studies Review, 16 (1): 29-42 
 
Karlberg, M. (2004). Beyond a Culture of Contest, Oxford: George Ronald 
 
Kluge, I. (2007). Relativisim and the Baha’i Writings. Paper presented at the Associated 
for Baha’is Studies, 31st Annual Conference 
 
Lample, P. (2009). Revelation and Social Reality: Learning to Translate What is Written 
into Reality, West Palm Beach: Palabra Publications 
 
Lavallée, L. F. (2009). Practical Application of an Indigenous Research Framework and 
Two Qualitative Indigenous Research Methods: Sharing Circles and Anishnaabe Symbol-
Based Reflection. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 8(1): 21–40 
 
Louis, R. P. (2008). Can you hear us now? Voices from the Margin: Using Indigenous 
Methodologies in Geographic Research. Geographical Research, 45(1):130–139  
 
 
Louw, D.J. (2001). Ubuntu and the Challenge of Multiculturalism in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa. Unitwin Student Nework. Available from: http://www.phys.uu.nl/˜unitwin/ 
Accessed 4 November 2014 
 
Mangena, F. (2017). Hunhu/Ubuntu in the Traditional Thought of Southern Africa, 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Available: http://www.iep.utm.edu/hunhu/#SH6c, Accessed 
9 October 2017 
 
Marx, C. (2002). Ubu and Ubuntu: On the Dialectics of Apartheid and Nation Building, 
Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 29(1):49-69 
 
Matthias, S. (2017) in Zalta, E.N. (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Metaphysics Research Lab, Standford University 
 
Mbigi, L. & Maree, J. (1995). Ubuntu: the Spirit of African Transformation Management. 
Randburg: Knowledge Resources 
 
Menkiti, I.A. (2004). Physical and Metaphysical Understanding, in Brown, L. (2004)(ed), 
African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, New York: Oxford University 
Press: 107-135 
 
Metz, T. (2015). African Ethics and Journalism Ethics: News and Opinion in Light of 
Ubuntu. Journal of Media Ethics: Exploring Questions of Media Morality, 30(2):74-90. 
 
Metz, T. (2014). Harmonizing Global Ethics in the Future: A Proposal to Add South and 
fEast to West. Journal of Global Ethics, 10(2):146-155. 
 
Metz, T. (2011a). Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa. African 
Human Rights Law Journal, 11(1):532-559 
 
Metz, T. (2011b). Contemporary African Philosophy, Oxford Bibliographies Online, 8 
July 2011, http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/view/document/obo-978.../obo-
9780195396577-0164.xml?rskey=f9Ebgq&result=1&q=metz&print, Accessed 13 April 
2018 
Metz, T. & Gaie, J. (2010). The African Ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for 
Research on Morality. Journal of Moral Education, 39(1):273-290 
 
Mkhize, N. (2008). Ubuntu and Harmony: An African Approach to Morality and Ethics. 
In Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture: 35-44. Edited by 
Nicolson, R.  Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press 
 
Mnyaka M. & Motlhabi, M. (2005). The African concept of Ubuntu/Botho and its Socio-
moral Significance. Black Theology, 3(1):215-237 
 
Mnyaka M.& Motlhabi, M. (2009). Ubuntu and its Socio-Moral Significance. In African 
Ethics; An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics: 63-84. Edited by Murove, 
M.F. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwazulu Natal Press 
 
Mokgoro, Y. (1998). Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa. Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal,1 (1):1-11 
 
Mosley, A. (2004). Witchcraft, Science and the Paranormal in Contemporary African 
Philosophy in Brown, L. (2004)(ed). African Philosophy: New and Traditional 
Perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Mucina, D. D. (2011). Story as Research Methodology. AlterNative: An International 
Journal of Indigenous Peoples, 7(1): 1–14 
 
Nabudere, D.W. (2011). Afrikology, Philosophy and Wholeness: An Epistemology. 
Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa 
 
Ong, W. (1974). Agonistic Structures in Academia: Past to Present, Interchange: Journal 
of Education, 5(1):1-12 
 
Pobee, J.S. (1979). Towards an African Theology. Nashville: Abingdon Press. 
 
Ramose, M.B. (1999). African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books 
 
Ramose, M.B. (2002a). I Conquer, Therefore I Am Sovereign: Reflections Upon 
Sovereignty, Constitutionalism, and Democracy in Zimbabwe and South Africa, in 
Coetzee, P.H. & Roux, A.P.J. (eds)(2002). The African Philosophy Reader, London: 
Routledge 
 
Ramose, M.B. (2002b). The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a Philosophy, in 
Coetzee, P.H. & Roux, A.P.J. (eds)(2002). The African Philosophy Reader, London: 
Routledge 
 
Rodny-Gumede, Y. (2015). An Assessment of the Public Interest and Ideas 
of the Public in South Africa and the Adoption of Ubuntu Journalism. Journal of Mass 
Media Ethics, 30(2):109-124 
 
Roy, P. K. (1986). African Theory of Knowledge. The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy, 
6(1&2) 
 
Ruch, E. A. O., & Anyanwu, K. C. (1981). An Introduction to the Main Philosophical 
Trends in Contemporary Africa. Rome: Catholic Book Agency  
 
Seehawer, M.K. (2018). Decolonizing Research in a Sub-Saharan African Context: 
Exploring Ubuntu as a Foundation for Research Methodology, Ethics and Agenda, 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 21(3): 1-14 
 
Senghor, L. S. (1964). On African Socialism. London: Fredrick A Praeger Publishers 
 
Senghor, L. S. (1965). Prose and Poetry. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd 
 
Smith, T. & Karlberg, M. (2009). Articulating a Consultative Epistemology: Toward a 
Reconciliation of Truth and Relativism, The Journal of Bahá’í Studies, 19(1/4): 59-99 
 
Sogolo, G. (2003). Logic and Rationality, in Coetzee, P.H. and Roux, A.P.J (2003)(eds). 
The African Philosophy Reader, New York: Routledge 
 
Suttner, R. (2017). Op-Ed: Decolonising Project – What is the Place of Ubuntu? Daily 
Maverick, 27 September, 2017. Available from: 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-09-27-op-ed-decolonising-project-what-is-
the-place-of-ubuntu/#.WcuJJkyB2YV, Accessed 27 September 2017  
 
Swanson, D. M. (2012). Ubuntu, African Epistemology and Development: Contributions, 
Tensions, Contradictions and Possibilities. In Wright, H.K. and Abdi, A.A 
(eds)(2012), The Dialectics of African education and Western discourses: Appropriation, 
Ambivalence and Alternatives, New York: Peter Lang, 27–52 
 
Tavernaro-Haidarian, L. (2018a). A Relational Model of Public Discourse: The African 
Philosophy of Ubuntu, New York/London: Routledge 
 
Tavernaro-Haidarian, L. (2018b). Ubuntu and the Communication-Power Nexus, in 
Mutsvairo, B. (2018). The Palgrave Handbook of Media and Communication Research in 
Africa, London: Palgrave McMillan 
 
Tavernaro-Haidarian, L. (2018c).  Evolving ‘Discoarse’ into Discourse: Ubuntu as a 
Normative Basis, Communicatio 43(3-4):1-17 
 
Tavernaro-Haidarian, L. (2017). Talking Ubuntu: Towards a Relational Talk Show 
Model, Journal of African Media Studies 9(3): 435-449 
 
Tempels, P. (1959). Bantu Philosophy Paris. Presence Africain 
 
Tomaselli, K.G. (2003). Our Culture vs Foreign Culture. Gazette: International Journal 
for Communication Studies, 65(6):427-444 
 
Tutu, D. (1999). No Future without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday 
Vanier, J. (1998). Becoming Human, Toronto: Anansi 
 
Udefi, A. (2014). The Rationale for an African Epistemology: A Critical Examination of 
the Igbo Views on Knowledge, Belief, and Justification, Canadian Social Science, 10 (3): 
108-117 
 
Van Binsbergen, W. (2003). Intercultural Encounters: African and Anthropological 
Lessons Towards a Philosphy of Interculturality, Munster: LIT Verlag 
 
Vicencio, C.V. (2009). Walk with Us and Listen: Political Reconciliation in Africa. Cape 
Town: University of Cape Town Press 
 
Wasserman, H. (2013). Journalism in a New Democracy: The Ethics of Listening. 
Communicatio: South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research, 
39(1):67-84. 
 
Wenning, C.J. (2009). Scientific Epistemology: How Scientists Know What they Know, 
Journal of Physics Teacher Education Online, 5(2): 1-15. 
 
Werbner, R. & Ranger, T. (1996). Postcolonial Identities in Africa, London: Zed Books 
 
Wiredu, K. (2004). Truth and an African Language, in Brown, L. (2004)(ed). African 
Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Wiredu, K. (2002). The Moral Foundations of an African Culture, in Coetzee, P.H. & 
Roux, A.P.J. (eds)(2002). The African Philosophy Reader, London: Routledge 
 
Wiredu, K. (1998). The Concept of Truth in the Akan Language. In Bodunrin, P.O. 
(ed.)(1998), Philosophy in Africa, Tends and Perfectives, Ile-Ife Nigeria: University of 
Ife Press 
 
Wiredu, K. (1990). Are There Cultural Universals? Quest Philosophical Discussions, 
4(1)  
 
Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Wiredu, K. (1995). Conceptual Decolonization in African Philosophy: Four Essays, In 
Oladip, O.(ed.), Ibadan: Hope Publications 
 
Yount, D.J. (2013). Empiricism versus Rationalism, Messac.Edu, Available from: 
http://www.mesacc.edu/~davpy35701/text/empm-v-ratm.html, Accessed 12 October 
2017 
